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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores how feedback prices influence firms' investment on asset liquidity through 
stock liquidity. Using a sample of the Tunisian listed firms between 1999 and 2010, empirical 
results confirm that stock market liquidity plays a significant role in investment decisions and 
show that high stock liquidity encourages firms to invest more on asset liquidity to overcome 
feedback prices (negative and positive feedback). Therefore, the paper’s findings demonstrate the 
link between stock markets and the current business activity of the firm. Furthermore, the results 
indicate how stock liquidity strengthens feedback prices effects on managerial decisions and 
choices, which highlights the importance of stock liquidity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
inancial theories argue that stock liquidity affects corporate financial decisions by reducing cost of 
capital and facilitating access to more funds on the capital markets. Hence, firms with more liquid 
stocks have less financial constraints and may pursue investments even if their projects are risky. 
Moreover, stock liquidity has a corporate governance role and reduces agency conflicts (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1982; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Even so, stock liquidity may influence managerial decisions and choices 
through feedback from stock prices (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001, Fang et al. 2009). Recently, many empirical 
studies are interested in linking the stock liquidity to both the firms’ policy and decisions. Butler et al. (2005) and 
Lipson and Mortal (2009), among others, examine the relationship between stock liquidity and financial decisions 
(debt policy and equity issuance). They confirm that firms with high liquidity level have lower issuance costs, which 
encourages them to use more funds like debt. In the same vein, Fang et al. (2009) find out that high stock liquidity 
enhances firm value.  
 
Most previously cited papers are interested in developed markets. However, emerging markets have 
attracted little attention. Munoz (2013) focuses on the relationship between firm investment and stock liquidity, in 
Latin American firms. He finds a positive association between investment and stock liquidity which is more 
pronounced for firm issuing shares. Ben khediri and Daadaa (2011) provide evidence that Tunisian firms with more 
liquid stocks have less leverage ratio.  
 
This article seeks to answer the following question: Does the stock liquidity influence the firms’ investment 
in liquid assets in emerging markets like Tunisia?   
 
This article contributes to the understanding of the relationship between market microstructure and 
corporate finance, in thin markets. This study adds to the existing evidence in two distinct ways. Firstly, it focuses 
on investment decision on liquid assets, which plays a main role in defining corporate financial policy. In other 
words, firms may accumulate liquid assets or cash to have more financial flexibility and meet their unanticipated 
contingencies if the costs of other financing resources are high (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Opler et al., 1999; Han and 
Qiu, 2007; Sufi, 2009; Lins et al. 2010). From the agency theory perspective, more cash leads self-interesting 
F 
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managers to make more decisions by ignoring shareholders’ interests, for example over investing in non-profitable 
projects rather than distributing dividends. Secondly, the Tunisian stock exchange (TSE) was chosen to explore this 
issue because it has less market liquidity than other emerging markets. Furthermore, in spite of all reforms 
undertaken by Tunisian regulators, statistics of the emerging countries from S&P
1
 for the year 2005 reveal that this 
market is the least developed market in comparison to the markets of the Middle East and the North African 
(MENA) region. In addition, the investor protection level in the Tunisian market is ranking below other markets. 
When investor’s protections are poor, Dittmar et al. (2003) found that some factors that generally influence cash 
holding, such as investment opportunities and asymmetric information, become less important. Also, they show that 
firms that operate in these countries tend to hold higher levels of cash.  
 
The current study draws on a sample of 30 Tunisian listed firms between 1999 and 2010, in which the link 
between stock liquidity and investment in liquid assets was investigated. In fact, empirical findings provide evidence 
that stock liquidity boost the firms’ investment in liquid assets. This finding is consistent with the theory of positive 
feedback prediction. Indeed, liquidity enhances prices informativeness to stakeholders and as consequence 
determines managerial decisions. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the literature and 
develops hypotheses. The sample and the methodology design are described in Section 3. The results are discussed 
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITTERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The theory of positive feedback from stock prices is developed by Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) where 
they investigate how feedback influences managerial decisions and choices. They argue that a stock price affects a 
firm’s perception by its stakeholders: customers, suppliers, employees, lenders, and other stakeholders. For instance, 
firms with higher stock prices attract customers and employees and may have lower cost of capital. As a result, these 
perceptions may influence firm’s managerial decisions: purchase, supply and investment decisions, which affect the 
firm’s cash flow.  
 
Goldstein et al. (2013) argue that when a trading frenzy arises, it affects both prices and firm cash flows, 
which legitimatly the worries the firm and the intervention of regulators. Indeed, fund providers make their decision 
to provide their funds to the firm or not, based on the assessment of the return on investment. To do this, they rely 
not only on their private information but also on the information aggregated by the firm’s stock price in the financial 
market. 
 
Since the stock price reflects the firm’s financial situation in general, the firms profitability in particular, it 
affects decisions by various agents, such as capital providers. In actual fact, when speculators in the financial market 
short sell a stock, price decreases, then capital providers update downward their expectation of the firm's 
profitability. As a consequence, the firm's access to capital market is weakening, the firm's value decreasing and 
short sellers are becoming able to make a profit.  
 
Some studies (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001; Khanna and Sonti, 2004 and Fang et al. 2009 among 
others) link the stock liquidity, feedback prices and managerial firms’ decisions together. They advance that the 
entry of informed investors in the market is increasing with stock liquidity. Thus, informed trading makes prices 
more informative to investors, employees, customers and other stakeholders. This feedback effect improves firm 
performance by increasing operating performance on the one hand, and relaxing financial constraints on the other. 
Therefore, the prices’ feedback is more important for liquid stocks.  
 
Nyborg and Wang (2014) advance a positive association between cash holding and stock liquidity. They 
suggest that when stock liquidity increases, prices are more informative but the information may have either a 
positive or negative effect. If prices decrease (negative effect) firms support the high cost of capital and have more 
financial constraint. In this situation, firms must use their cash to limit the negative effect of prices feedback. On the 
contrary, if prices increase (positive effect), they reflect good information, may attract capital providers and reduce 
                                                 
1Statistics from Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2008). 
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cost of capital. In such case, firms may use their cash holding to boost positive effects of price feedback by buying 
their own stock in the market. Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated: 
 
H1:  High stock liquidity improves prices’ feedback, which increases asset liquidity 
 
According to the pecking order theory of Myers (1984), ﬁrms are incited to establish a finance hierarchy in 
which internal funds are less costly and preferred to external ﬁnancing. When firms suffer from information 
asymmetry problems, stock liquidity goes down and investors require higher stock return to compensate liquidity 
risk, which in turn induces a higher cost of external financing, especially the cost of equity (Amihud and Mendelsen, 
1986). As a result, these firms may support high cost of external funding, which encourages them to use internal 
funds (cash and liquid assets). Indeed, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms with high information asymmetry 
problems hold more liquid assets that are to be used as alternative funds.  
 
Moreover, some studies
2
 discussed how stock liquidity may be an effective control mechanism. When the 
market is more liquid, large shareholders prefer to control the firm and enjoy the benefits of informed trading. In 
addition, stock liquidity may incite managers to invest cash in profitable projects and to enhance firms' performance 
(Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pﬂeiderer, 2009) if their management’s compensation is tied to current stock prices. 
Hence, stock liquidity as a corporate governance mechanism may influence investment in liquid assets. When a 
firms experiences high stock liquidity, shareholders’ activism is more important. This discourages managers to 
adopt opportunistic behavior. Consequently, high stock liquidity enhances managers’ control, which reduces asset 
liquidity. The following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H2: High stock liquidity reduces asset liquidity 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The sample initially consisted of all non-financial firms listed on Tunis Stock Exchange (TSE) during the 
period 1999-2010. Then (1) non common ordinary stocks, namely investment certificates and preferred stocks 
without voting right; (2) new listed stocks that are not traded during the previous 6 months to remedy to the Initial 
public offering (IPO) effect and (3) stocks with missing data, were excluded. During the study period some 
companies were delisted and others introduced. The final sample contained 30 listed firms and 253 firm-year 
observations. The financial data set was hand collected from financial reports published on the Tunisia Stock 
Exchange web site (www.bvmt.com.tn).  Daily trading data was provided by TSE in CD-ROM and contained 
closing prices and trading volume. 
 
3.1. Variables Definition 
 
3.1.1. Asset Liquidity Measures 
 
Financial analysts use the liquidity ratio to estimate the firm riskiness, particularly when a firm’s activities 
are mostly funded by short-term debt (Claessens et al. 2000). Liquidity ratio is negatively associated with corporate 
risk in the sense that holding more cash means the firm is able to face a wider range of environmental contingencies 
and that more cash-constrained firms cannot do it (Cohen and al., 1972). There are three liquidity ratios commonly 
used in financial analysis and diagnosis of the ability of the firm to satisfy its short-term obligations (Smart and 
Graham, 2012). 
 
CUR  The current ratio is the most commonly cited financial ratios that define firms’ ability to meet short-term 
obligations. It is defined as current assets divided by current liabilities.  
QUR  The quick ratio is similar to the current ratio except that it excludes inventory. Indeed, this latter is usually 
the least liquid current assets because it is typically sold on credit or cannot be easily sold. 
CSR  The cash ratio is defined as a company's total cash and cash equivalents to its current liabilities. The cash 
ratio is most commonly used as a measure of company liquidity. It can therefore, determine if, and how 
quickly, the company can repay its short-term debt. 
                                                 
2 Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) and  Maug (1998) 
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3.1.2. Stock Liquidity Measure 
 
The turnover-adjusted number of days with zero trading volume is proposed by Liu (2006) as a 
multidimensional measure of liquidity. It captures the three dimensions of liquidity: the continuity of trading and the 
potential delay or difficulty in executing an order, the dimension of trading quantity, i.e. volume, and the trading-
cost dimension of liquidity (Liu, 2006).   
 
It’s written: 
LIU
x
= NoZV
x
+
1/TURN
x
Deflator
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
21x
NoTD
 
 
where NoZV  is the number of zero-volume trading days; TURN  is the stock turnover, i.e., the ratio of shares 
traded per day to outstanding shares, and NoTD  is the total number of trading days in the market during the period 
x . 
 
In line with Liu (2006), a deflator is chosen in a way that the following condition is satisfied for all stocks in the 
sample: 
 
0 á
1/TURN
x
Deflator
á 1 
 
A deflator of 3 500 000 to construct LIU
12
(the average number of trading days in a year) was used. The ratio 21x
NoTD
 
standardizes the number of trading days in a month to 21 to make it comparable over time. In other words, it 
measures the average number of trading days in x  months. 
 
3.1.3. Control variables  
 
Common control variables for cash holding regressions include: 
 
MTB  Investment opportunities measured by market-to-book assets ratio. Opler et al. (1999) show that firms 
having high growth opportunities, hold more cash.  
SIZE  The firm size is measured by total assets, which indicates the firm’s ability to accede ﬁnancial markets. 
Small firms are more financially constrained than large ones (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Hence, small 
firms are more incited to hold cash. 
ROA  Firm performance is considered as cash holdings’ determinant. Some studies (among others Hager, 1976 
and Kamath, 1989 and Jose et al. 1996) point out the negative association between cash holdings and firms’ 
performance; firms that have less cash usually have better operating performance. In contrast, Czyzewski 
and Hicks (1992) show a positive association between cash and performance. They advance that successful 
firms have a high level of liquidity assets, which can actually produce higher than average ROA.  
 
According to Loukil and Yousfi (2013), owner identity matters more than ownership concentration for 
Tunisian firms. They show that there are three types of owners: foreign, State and family owners. Thus, three 
dummy variables were used to distinguish between these owners and are defined as follows: 
FAM=  
                                      
          
  
STA=  
                                         
          
  
FOR=  
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In regressions, the dummy variable reflects the presence of State control as the reference group were excluded.  
 
Since industrial and basic material industries are expected to invest more on fixed assets, the two industry dummies 
included are as follows: 
 
INDS  This variable takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to industrial industry and zero otherwise. 
MBAS  This variable takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to material base industry and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 1. Variables And Measure’ Definitions 
Variables  Symbol Definitions 
Asset liquidity 
Current ratio CUR Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
Quick ratio QUR (Current assets-inventory) divided by current liabilities 
Cash ratio CSR Total cash and cash equivalents to its current liabilities. 
Stock liquidity Delay of execution LIU 
The turnover-adjusted number of days with zero trading volume 
proposed by Liu (2006) 
Control 
variables 
Firm size SIZE Total assets  
Investment opportunities  MTB Market to book assets ratio  
Performance ROA Return on assets  
Ultimate owner identity 
FOR 
This variable takes the value of 1 if firms are controlled by 
foreign investor and zero otherwise.   
FAM 
This variable takes the value of 1 if firms are controlled by 
family and zero otherwise. 
Industry dummies 
INDS 
This variable takes the value of 1 if firm belongs to industrial 
industry and zero otherwise. 
MBAS 
This variable takes the value of 1 if firm belongs to material 
base industry and zero otherwise. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of asset liquidity measures, stock liquidity and firm characteristics. 
Statistics (see Panel A) indicate that non-financial Tunisian firms have, on average, enough cash to meet short term 
obligation when they transform current assets on liquidity (CUR> 1 and QUR > 1). As previously defined, the quick 
ratio is a more conservative proxy of liquidity than the current ratio as it removes inventory from the current assets 
used in the ratio formula. By excluding inventory, the quick ratio focuses on the more-liquid assets of a company.  
On average, the current ratio is significantly higher than quick ratio, which means that the company's current assets 
are dependent on inventory. Statistics indicate that on average, firms are unable to repay short term debt (CRS < 1). 
Hence, this ratio demonstrates the importance of accounts receivable in the composition of the company's current 
assets. All liquidity assets variables experience a high deviation, which may be due to the heterogeneity of the 
study’s sample. 
 
On average, Tunisian firms have a 72 non trading days with a high deviation (74 days). This result is not 
surprising because the sample included firms listed in both trading systems: fixing and continuous. The less liquid 
stocks are traded in fixing mode and the most liquid ones are traded in a continuous one. The market to book ratio 
(MTB) is, on average 2.53 deviates, which is high by 12.11, indicates that the sample is composed of firms with 
very high investment opportunities and other ones with low investment opportunities. 
 
On average, Tunisian firms have a return on assets ratio (ROA) of 4.95% which deviates highly with 
7.59%.  
 
Regarding ultimate owner's identity (see Panel B), Tunisian firms are highly concentrated and that only one 
observation presents dispersed ownership. The most frequent type of owner is the State (STA) with 45% of 
observations (firms-years). For the industry dummies included in the analysis (See Panel B), statistics show that 
23% of observations belong to industrial industry and 16% of observations belong to material basis industry, while 
61% of observations belong to the consumer goods and services industry(oil and gas, and telecommunications 
industries). 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Asset liquidity, stock liquidity and other financial characteristics variables 
 CUR QUR CRS LIU MTB SIZE ROA 
N 244 244 244 227 227 227 227 
Mean 2,4256 1,7281 ,2908 72,55 2,534 1,28 E+08 ,0495 
Median 1,7194 1,0997 ,0956 42,33 1,171 5,06 E+07 ,0454 
Std. Deviation 2,33543 2,27857 ,68363 74,124 12.11 2,79  E+08 ,0759 
Skewness 2,820 3,336 5,825 ,772 12,18 3,916 -,593 
Kurtosis 8,731 12,244 41,214 2,210 158,22 17,044 3.994 
Minimum ,31 ,16 ,00 ,00001 ,1366 1,03E+07 -,21 
Maximum 14,24 14,18 6,40 252,00 167,17 1,49E+09 ,24 
  
Panel B. Frequency of ultimate owners and industry dummies  
Ultimate owner types N %      
Dispersed  1 0.4%      
FOR 28 11.5%      
FAM 104 42.6%      
STA 111 45.5%      
Total observations 244       
        
Industry        
INDS 56 23,0%      
MBAS 39 16,0%      
Total observations 244       
 
Results (see Table 3) show that quick ratio and cash ratio are negatively and significantly associated with 
execution delay. However, non-significant joining is detected between current ratio and Liu’ measure. These 
correlations indicate that high stock liquidity level (short execution delay) is positively linked to high asset liquidity. 
 
The investment opportunities variable (MTB) one side is positively correlated and significantly correlated 
with quick ratio and on the other is negatively and significantly mutually connected with execution delay (LIU). 
Firms with high levels of liquid asset, have more investment opportunities and more liquid stocks. Firm size is 
negatively and significantly related to asset liquidity measures (CUR and QUR) and to execution delay (LIU). 
Hence, large firms invest more on fixed assets than liquid assets and have more liquid stocks. Return on assets 
(ROA) are positively and significantly correlated with all asset liquidity measures, it’s negatively and significantly 
correlated to Liu’ measure. These correlations show that firms with high performance invest more in liquid assets 
and have liquid stocks.  
 
For ultimate owner's identity, a correlation matrix indicates that foreign owner presence is positively 
correlated with asset liquidity ratios (CUR and QUR). Yet, the family owner presence is negatively correlated with 
asset liquidity ratios (CUR and CRS). Foreign controlled firms invest more in liquid assets than family controlled 
ones. 
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Table 3. Spearman Correlation Matrix 
  CUR QUR CRS FOR FAM LIU MTB ROA SIZE 
CUR 1 
        
QUR ,761
*** 1 
       
CRS ,339
*** ,494*** 1 
      
FOR ,210
*** ,171*** 0,002 1 
     
FAM -,176
** -0,096 -,185*** -,310*** 1 
    
LIU -0,004 -,138
** -0,131* -0,051 -0,018 1 
   
MTB 0,013 ,144
** 0,066 ,444*** 0,077 -,145** 1 
  
ROA ,393
*** ,363*** ,198*** ,381*** 0,115* -,147** ,517*** 1 
 
SIZE -,438
*** -,184*** 0,003 ,165** -0,117* -,307*** ,149** -0,118* 1 
*. **. *** are respectively significance level of 10%. 5%. 1% 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Basic Analysis 
 
The relationship between stock liquidity and asset liquidity, through a multiple regression with panel data, 
was studied. Thus, the following model was estimated: 
 
                                                                                             
 7    ( −  + 8    ( −  +     (1) 
 
Where ALIQ is one of the three asset liquidity variables: current ratio (CUR) quick ratio (QUR), cash ratio (CSR).    
    is the error term of a firm   at year  . The idea is to estimate each model three times using asset liquidity, lagged 
stock liquidity variables and other control variables. 
 
Empirical findings (See Table 4) show both negative and significant coefficient of illiquidity measures on 
two measures of asset liquidity (current and quick ratios). These findings confirm that firms with high stock liquidity 
(short potential delay of executing an order) invest more on liquid assets. For this reason, accordingly hypothesis H1 
is accepted and H2 is rejected. The results have provided empirical support for the theory of positive feedback from 
stock prices and have corroborated those of Nyborg and Wang (2014). 
 
Table 4. The Impact Of Stock Liquidity On Asset Liquidity 
  CUR QUR CRS 
LIU -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003 
ROA 1.833*** 1.720*** 1.448 
SIZE -0.342*** -0.255*** -0.085 
MTB -0.081 -0.014 0.121 
FAM -0.341*** -0.203 -0.607** 
FOR 0.075 -0.003 -0.848 
INDS 0.089 -0.561*** -0.988*** 
MABS 0.648*** 0.736*** 1.018** 
Constant 6.814*** 4.758*** -0.387 
R squared 0.2271 0.2271 0.1570 
Observations 223 223 223 
Number of firms 30 30 30 
*. **. *** are respectively significance level of 10%. 5%. 1% 
 
Indeed, high level of liquidity increases the activity of informed agents which make prices more 
informative to investors, employees, customers and other stakeholders. Firms with more informative prices will hold 
more cash than other firms. In bad situations, prices’ decrease makes external funds costly for these firms, which 
encourages them to use cash held.  While in a good situation, price increases indicate that firms are well managed, 
which attracts capital providers and reduces cost of capital. Firms may use their cash holding to boost positive 
effects of price feedback by buying their own stocks in the market. 
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Results indicate both positive and significant effects of firms’ performance on asset liquidity measures (at 
level of 1%). Hence, firms that experience high performance invest more in liquid assets. Coefficients of firm size 
are negative and significant when current and quick ratio as asset liquidity measures were used. Indeed, small firms 
are more financially constrained and cannot accede easily to external funds like large ones, which encourages them 
to hold more liquid assets. 
 
For ultimate owner's identity, only the presence of family ultimate owner has a significant and negative 
coefficient on current ratio and cash ratio. Whereas, for quick ratio none ultimate owner proxies have a significant 
effect. It indicates that firms controlled by  family owners, invest less in liquid assets than firms controlled by 
foreign and State owners. These findings confirm the influence of owner's identity on financial corporate decisions.  
As far as industry dummy variables are concerned, a negative and significant coefficient of INDS on two measures 
of asset liquidity (quick and cash ratios) are found. In addition, results show positive and significant coefficients of 
MBAS on all regressions. Hence, industry types influence the level of asset liquidity. 
 
4.2. Robustness Analysis 
 
In order to check the robustness of the previous results, the stock price informativeness on asset liquidity 
measures regressed.  Firms with more informative prices are more transparent for their stakeholders.  On the one 
part, when these firms have a positive feedback prices, they can enjoy reduced cost of capital and use internal funds 
and liquidity to boost the positive feedback prices. On the other part, when firms have negative feedback prices, they 
must use internal funds because the cost of capital is high. In the two situations, firms with more informative prices 
hold more cash. Therefore, the hypothesis 3 is stated as follow:  
 
H3: The more informative the prices are, the more firms do hold cash.  
 
To estimate price informativeness, the proportion of zero returns proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999) was used and 
defined as follows: 
 
PZER =
numberof zero return
N
 
Where N is the number of trading day per year. 
 
They advance that investors will not trade unless the value of their private information is sufficient to 
exceed their trading costs. If the informed investors do not trade, then there is no change in price, and zero-return 
results. Zero returns may be due to the absence of new information. Similar to Skaife et al. (2006), it is considered 
that a lower proportion of zero-return days reflects the high frequency of a firm’s information flow. 
 
Table 5. Price Informativeness And Asset Liquidity 
  CUR QUR CRS 
PZER -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.010* 
ROA 1.561*** 1.474** 1.220 
SIZE -0.349*** -0.274*** -0.110 
MTB -0.082 -0.030 0.105 
FAM -0.303*** -0.177 -0.581** 
FOR 0.104 0.023 -0.815 
INDS 0.096 -0.548*** -0.976*** 
MABS 0.657*** 0.797*** 1.067*** 
Constant 7.099*** 5.309*** 0.285 
R squared 0.4010 0.2357 0.1591 
Observations 223 223 223 
Number of firms 30 30 30 
*. **. *** are respectively significance level of 10%. 5%. 1% 
 
Empirical findings indicate the robustness of previous ones and hypothesis H3 is accepted. There is a 
negative and significant relationship between the proportion of zero return and asset liquidity variables. A higher 
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proportion of zero return, indicating lower price informativeness, discourages firms to hold cash. Results also 
indicate that the R squared values (see table 5) are higher than those of the basic regressions (see table 4). Hence, 
price informativeness (PZER) determines more asset liquidity than illiquidity measure (LIU). These finding provide 
evidence that stock prices influence firms' cash policy through stock liquidity. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigated whether or not feedback prices influence corporate cash holdings through stock 
liquidity in emerging market.  The results confirm the existence of a link between stock liquidity and firm’s 
decisions. In other words, stock liquidity enhances firms’ investment in liquid assets through a feedback prices 
effect. Indeed, high stock liquidity increases stock price informativeness. As a consequence, firms are incited to hold 
more cash to overcome negative feedback prices and to enjoy benefits from positive feedback prices. In the present 
study, only causality effect of stock liquidity on corporate decisions was examined, which explains why lagged 
stock liquidity variables were used. However, corporate decisions and stock liquidity may have a joint causality 
effects. In fact, Nyborg and Wang’s (2014) study confirms the existence of a simultaneous relationship between 
stock liquidity and asset liquidity. It would be interesting to discover, in future studies, the joint effects between 
corporate decisions and stock liquidity. 
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